Misconstrued dependency

Influential columnist Roger Cohen expounded #link:http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/opinion/roger-cohen-the-iran-ukraine-affair.html:on a possible quid-pro-quo# between Washington and Moscow over the future of Ukraine and a nuclear agreement with Iran. Obama, so goes the argument, might be considering "selling out" Ukraine to Russia in exchange for the Kremlin's support for a nuclear deal with Iran.

Cohen presents no factual evidence for his theory or how this deal might transpire. He explicitly writes that he is "not suggesting there is any such formal Iran-Ukraine trade-off between the Obama administration and Putin." Instead he simply declares: "The abrupt flaring of new fighting in eastern Ukraine, and the abrupt Russian readiness to help on Iran ahead of the Nov. 24 deadline for nuclear talks, are not a mere coincidence."

Continued conflict

This assumption - that the latest round of violence in Ukraine and Moscow's alleged sudden willingness to help on a nuclear deal happened at the same time - leads Cohen to the conclusion that they are connected.

While it's impossible to disprove speculation as it is by definition not based on facts, it helps to add some context.

First, Cohen's description of an "abrupt flaring of new fighting" in Ukraine makes it seem that the ceasefire agreed to in Minsk in September had been holding and the situation was calm. It was not. Fighting had continued with varied intensity despite the Minsk agreement.

Second, it's true that Russian officials earlier this year warned the West that Moscow could change its position on a nuclear deal with Iran to up the pressure against Western sanctions against Russia over Ukraine. But it's also true that while Moscow has a complex relationship with Iran, a nuclear armed Islamic country in Russia's broader vicinity is simply not in the Kremlin's interest. What's more, Russia would profit economically from converting Iranian uranium as proposed during the negotiations recently.

Effect on NATO

Third, Cohen argues that "the unspoken price of an Iran deal, vital as it is, cannot be the loss of Ukraine and the unraveling of NATO." That conflates the fate of the Ukraine with that of NATO: But Ukraine is not a member of NATO. So while an assumed Russian takeover of the entire Ukraine would be terrible news for NATO, why should the "loss" of a country that is not even a member of the defense alliance unravel that said alliance?

Fourth, Cohen's central - if unspoken assumption - is that the Obama administration could prevent "the loss of Ukraine" to Russia if it only wants to. Unfortunately, he does not spell out how exactly he thinks Obama could do that. Does he mean militarily or by increased sanctions or both?

Most experts believe it would be very difficult if not impossible for the US and NATO to put a military halt to a full-fledged Russian offensive against Ukraine. Even more important, Obama and other world leaders, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, have clearly stated that the conflict with Russia can not be solved militarily. And they're right.

Stricter sanctions could further increase the political and economic cost for the Kremlin's campaign in Ukraine, but they would have a mid to long-term effect and would not prevent further Russian aggression right now.

Deal depends on Iran and US

To be clear: Russia's aggression in Ukraine is indefensible. It's an inconvenient truth that the West could not halt a further military escalation by Moscow. Now it's up to the United States and European Union to make clear to the Kremlin that any additional power grab in Ukraine would not be in Moscow's interest and would be harshly sanctioned by the West.

To be equally clear, a nuclear deal with Iran is not only of key importance to Tehran and Washington, but ultimately to Moscow as well. If Iran and the United States both really want this deal, and there are indications that they do, than they will find a way to get it done - with Moscow's help or without it.