After the surge: which way forward for the NATO allies?

A war on several fronts

But the battlefield in South Asia is far greater than Afghanistan itself. The nerve center of the Taliban and Al Qaida as well as other radical Islamist armed groups remains in the predominantly Pashtun tribal territories of Pakistan, where the Pakistani military is now embroiled in a full scale military effort to crush the enemy within in what has become a regional civil war in all but name.

The sensitive issue of Pakistani sovereignty and the divisions within a larger Pakistani society that extend to the armed forces and security services themselves over the Taliban, deprives Obama and indeed NATO of any military solution on the other side of the Durand line, the invisible frontier that separates Afghanistan from Pakistan.

The war in Afghanistan has spilled over into Pakistan and is yet another headache for western allies

Cross-border "hot pursuit" of the insurgents, is not an option for NATO. As matters stand the Taliban is able to strike at will into Afghanistan and then retreat to its sanctuary in the territories, where its communications, logistics and command structures, as well as a broad base of popular support are entrenched. The US has opted for repeated unmanned missile strikes against key insurgent and terror leaders into Pakistan, but these too often have negative repercussions on the diplomatic front with Islamabad when the attacks provoke civilian casualties.

Afghanistan at a crossroad

In the aftermath of the recent Afghan elections, the notion of an Allied effort meant to secure and promote the greater democratization of Afghanistan has also started to ring hollow. Afghan government institutions remain notoriously corrupt, the lot of the average Afghan, remains one of poverty, hunger and insecurity leaving the US and NATO in its partnership with Karzai, embarrassed, often angry at what many decry as an unviable pairing unlikely to achieve success.

Of the untold billions spent on reconstruction and the many more needed to continue prosecuting the war, the massive costs have also made the Europeans shy away, not just the consistently heavy combat casualties. "European politicians follow public opinion closely and in light of the economic crisis they're more inclined to assign that money to social spending than the war," said Williams.

The manner in which the war is fought has also been undergoing review and adjustment. General Stanley McChrystal, has emphasized the need to provide greater security for the Afghan civilian population and stressed the need for more effective hearts and minds efforts in spurring reconstruction.

But McChrystal's approach is a labor-intensive one and it will mean a steady stream of casualties which increasingly have stirred public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, when a clear-cut military victory in Afghanistan, delivered anytime soon, seems all but impossible.

What will come after the fighting?

And herein lies the crux of Afghanistan's great strategic question, the United States and its European allies, despite diplomatic niceties, simply do not yet posses a common vision of what allied goals might be in the Hindu Kush and certainly do not agree yet on an equal sharing of the burden, though neither in Washington nor any European capital with soldiers in harm's way, is there much enthusiasm for a prolonged and open-ended war.

The one refrain all can agree on is that international soldiers will stay on in Afghanistan long enough for the Afghan national army and national police to carry the main weight of ensuring security and fighting the war so the Taliban may be contained.

While Obama has made it clear that the new troop surge is to "get the job done," the new commitment has also come with an endgame and the announcement that US forces will begin to withdraw in July of 2011. The whispering in European corridors of power is if Afghanistan ultimately means retreat, then why should it cost more in treasure and men?

As one defense analyst close to the German Ministry of Defense told Deutsche Welle on the condition of anonymity, "we cannot further nor more deeply commit ourselves to a strategic concept that is not completely and tightly ironed out. What constitute the parameters of the mission objective, what means success or defeat and is it worth the cost?"

It is a question Obama himself is trying to answer.

Author: Chris Kline
Editor: Rob Mudge